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presumably is a stranger with no knowledge of the vendor's character, and the wife, a policy protecting the third party appears
equitably justified. But if the vendee has knowledge of the marital status of the husband and chooses to rely solely on statements
recorded in the sale, the equities might favor the wife, for in
such a case the vendee is not, in fact, "innocent."
It is impossible to say definitely that the Royal decision
favors the rules of recordation over those protecting community
rights, or that the decision is based solely on its peculiar facts
and equities. For this reason, the case creates uncertainty in an
area of law which had heretofore appeared certain, 7 and which
should be certain. A definite statement of policy is clearly needed
concerning the extent to which the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker
has priority over the rights of the community of acquets and
gains. This uncertainty in the law is a proper subject for the
forthcoming revision of the Civil Code. It might have been desirable for the court to announce a clearer interim policy.
WADE V.

SMITH

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-STATUTE SETTING MINIMUM MARK UP
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO
CARRY OUT LEGISLATIVE POLICY

Louisiana Act 360 of 19481 provided for wholesale minimum
mark ups above cost of 15 per cent on liquor, 20 per cent on
cordial liqueurs and specialties, and 25 per cent on sparkling
and still wines; and for retail mark ups of 33% per cent on liquor,
45 per cent on cordials, liqueurs and specialties, and 50 per cent
on sparkling and still wines. Schwegmann Brothers failed to
comply with these requirements, and on revocation of their license
instituted suit to enjoin enforcement of the act, alleging denial
of due process. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed an order
granting the injunction: ". . . the provisions of Act 360 of 1948
which relate to the mandatory minimum mark ups (Sections
1 [s], 24 and 26) do not tend in a degree that is perceptible and
clear, toward the accomplishment of the announced purpose of
the statute, namely, the regulation and control of the liquor
traffic so that it 'may not cause injury to the economic, social
17. The policy stated in Succession of James had been applied as early
as Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188, 23 Am. Dec. 478 (1832), nearly a hun-

dred years before. Since the James case, its decision was cited with approval
in Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 1101, 36 So. 2d 396, 399 (1948).
1. La. R.S. (1950) 26:1 et seq.
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and moral well-being of the people of the State.'" 2 Schwegmann
Brothers v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216
La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248'(1949).
The argument urged in support of constitutionality was that
the act was a valid exercise of the police power for the protection
of the health and morals of the public. The approach taken was
natural in the light of the historical development of the police
power, which has long been associated with the "health and
morals" concept. Early courts were unwilling to uphold pricefixing legislation except in "businesses affecting the public interest," and they limited this category to include only public utilities.3 But during the depression and the New Deal era, the
attitude of the United States Supreme Court began to change,
and in the case of Nebbia v. New York 4 the court went to great
lengths to show that the regulatory power of the legislatures
was not limited to a single category of industries. "So far as the
requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.
If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
*proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied .... The rule of the Nebbia case recognized economic legislation
under the police power. The legislature became free to make its
own policy. "If the law-making body within its sphere of government concludes that the conditions or practices in an industry
make unrestricted competition an inadequate safeguard of the
consumer's interests, produce waste harmful to the public,
threaten ultimately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed
by the public, or portend the destruction of the industry itself,
appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the
2. 216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248, 259 (1949).
3. Although the courts used the words "affected with public interest" in
classifying businesses whose charges might be regulated, the category was
limited. The fixing of wages (Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
[1923]), prices on theater tickets (Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
[1927]), employment agency rates'(Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 [1928]),

gasoline prices (Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 [1929]), were
declared a denial of due process.
4. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
5. 291 U.S. 502, 537. This case is often approvingly quoted by the Louisiana
courts in handling similar problems.
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threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixes prices reasonably deemed by the legislature
to be fair to those engaged in the industry and to the consuming
public. . . . Price control, like any other form of regulation, is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and
hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty."6
The act involved in the case under consideration may, therefore, have been cited as a constitutional exercise of police power
for a legitimate economic purpose-the aid to an industry in
need. It is significant that the Louisiana court was willing to
follow the very words of the Nebbia case 7 but found that the operation of the act did not fall under the Nebbia rule because it
proved arbitrary; consequently, the case contains no denial of
the legislative power of regulation.
With some exceptions, state courts, unlike the federal courts,
have retained a comparatively'high degree of control over legislation.8 However, Louisiana has maintained an attitude similar
to that of the United States courts. The last instance found in
which a legislative act in exercise of the police power was declared
unconstitutional for depriving due process in the substantive field
was under the narrow facts of State v. Lucas,9 decided in 1940.
In the case of Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker 0 the
court, refusing to question the judgment of the legislature, upheld
minimum price regulation of the barber industry on the ground
of protection of the health of the people. The court has often
used the expression: "Legislation which affects alike all persons
pursuing the same business under the same conditions is not
such class legislation as is prohibited by the constitution of the
United States or of the State." " In Ricks v. Department of State
6. 291 U.S. 502, 538.
7. 216 La. 148, 175, 43 So. 2d 248, 257 (1949).
8. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States,
34 Minn. L. Rev. 91 (1950).
9. State v. Lucas, 196 La. 299, 199 So. 126 (1940). License fee of $5,000 to be
paid to each parish in which there was collection for rights, royalties or rents
on copyrighted music books, etc., was held unconstitutional because the
excessive charge was prohibitive and deprived everyone of his right to carry
on a lawful business.
10. Board of Barber Examiners of Louisiana v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182
So. 485 (1938).
11. City of Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 492, 182 So. 649, 652
(1938).
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Civil Service12 the court said, "It is not the function of this court
to charge the Legislature with making arbitrary or discriminatory classifications in the absence of clear manifestation that such
was the case." 13 The resale price maintenance provisions of
the Louisiana Fair Trade Act14 and the Unfair'Sales Act"5 have
been upheld,' 6 the court thereby recognizing as valid legislation
designed to benefit the economic interests of a particular class.
Because of the similar attitudes of the federal and Louisiana
courts on the question presented, a test of constitutionality may
be devised which can be applied in either of the jurisdictions. It
may be said that if there is room for honest arguments that the
policy is intended for the general welfare of the public and if
an honest argument can be made that the act also carries into
effect this legislative policy, then the act will be upheld. The
benefit granted to the particular industry must be balanced
against the loss incurred by the public in order to determine its
reasonableness as regards the public welfare.
In the present case the principal interest benefited can be
ascertained by an examination of the nature of the demand for
the commodity. Department of Revenue figures indicate that
the demand for liquor in the given price range is relatively
inelastic. 17 In such a case the principal benefit is to the business
itself since a price increase on an item for which the demand is
inelastic will result in greater total profit to the industry. Conversely, in an elastic market (if a decrease in consumption is
considered to be in the public interest) the principal benefit
would accrue to the health and morals of the people since consumption of the item would decrease more than proportionately
with the price increase. However, even where the demand is
inelastic a price increase will result in some decreased consumption. Whether or not the amount of decrease in such a case is
sufficient to accomplish the purpose is for legislative determination, subject, of course, to the above test.
An important difference is to be noted between maximum
12. Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So. 2d 49
(1942).
13. 200 La. 341, 360, 8 So. 2d 49, 55.
14. La. Act 13 of 1936 (La. R.S. [1950) 51:391 et seq.).
15. La. Act 338 of 1940 (La. R.S. [1950] 51:421 et seq.).
16. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) and
Wholesale Distributors Ass'n v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403 (1948)
respectively.
17. Louisiana Department of Revenue figures show a decrease In consumption of only .501% for the twelve month period immediately following
passage of the act over the preceding twelve month period.
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and minimum price regulation. Maximum price regulation is
generally designed to benefit the public as a whole in that reasonable prices under monopolistic conditions are guaranteed. Minimum price regulation, on the other hand, is designed primarily
to benefit those engaged in selling the regulated item, except
where public policy favors decreased consumption. Even where
such policy considerations are present, if the demand is inelastic,
the benefit accrues to the sellers. The present trend of the court
has been to favor the interest of the public as a whole at the
expense of individual groups where the two interests conflict.
It was, therefore, not surprising that the court in this case was
unwilling to hold as constitutional an act benefiting a particular
group at the expense of the public in general where no economic
8
need could be shown.1
CHAPMAN

L.

SANFORD

18. For a further discussion of this case, see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term, 11 LOUISIANA LAW RviEw 197 (1951).

